INTRODUCTION
One of the more difficult issues in the debate over policy to reduce carbon dioxide emissions is calculating the cost. The only way to do so directly is to use a dynamic general equilibrium model. A dynamic general equilibrium model could be used to calculate the growth path of the economy and the impact that a constraint on the consumption of carbon dioxide would have on growth and welfare. However, dynamic general equilibrium models are very complicated.
1. See Stern, N. The Stern Review, . For a discussion of the displacement of coal by gas, see Kaplan, Displacing Coal with Generation from Existing Natural Gas-Fired Power Plants, 2010. They can only be solved on a computer, and it is necessary to make many implicit assumptions about structure and explicit assumptions about parameter values. This complexity limits the value of the models in the political discourse. A biased party can achieve a desired result with less-than-transparent assumptions or pick the model that supports their political agenda. At the present time, there are many models that predict the cost of carbon dioxide, with a range in results that vary by at least a factor of five. 1 All economic modeling that requires assumptions about the future is continually surprised by unforeseen developments. In electricity generation, such a development has taken place over the last few years because of the rapid emergence of large supplies of non-conventional natural gas. Currently natural gas prices are about 1/3 of their peak value in 2008. While natural gas prices have exhibited large fluctuations in the past, it is likely that the recent rapid price decreases will be at least semi-permanent because the development of new sources of natural gas is a remarkable innovation. This change in the natural gas market will profoundly affect the electricity generation industry.
These developments have profoundly affected the outlook resulting from the conclusions of several research papers, e.g. Kettunen, et al. (2011) , Patino, et al. (2009) , Newcomer and Apt (2009) , Bergerson and Lave (2007) , concerned with modeling the effects of carbon dioxide policy upon business decisions. This comment is not intended as any criticism of these papers; no models of the future are ever able to take into account disruptive new developments.
Our goal in this paper is limited; we do not propose to foresee any future event. Our aim is to provide a means for calculating the cost of a carbon dioxide constraint in the production of electricity as a function of the price of fuels with coal and natural gas in competition. We calculate the cost of a carbon dioxide constraint in a model where the assumptions are transparent and the model is relatively simple. The mathematics used to derive the model is common in many technical fields. The derivation of the model can be checked with a few hours of work. The resulting equations are simple and can be solved with a spreadsheet.
This simplicity comes at a cost. This paper models the displacement of coal generation by gas, so the forecast period is probably on the order of 20 years.
2 Beyond that period, reductions in carbon dioxide must come from reductions in transport fuels or the replacement of gas electricity generation by nuclear power or renewables, etc. This transition may be very costly or not, depending on technical advances. Prediction of technical change is very difficult, and the technologies available 20 years in the future are probably not the main element driving the current debate.
The parameters used in our calculations are readily available in the public domain. Most of the parameters are reported in the 2009 Update of the 2003 5.92 ‫ן‬ 10 tons epa_sum.html, Table 2 .1, and http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/flowchart.html.
6. For a discussion of some of the institutional problems in a transition from coal to gas see Wolak, F., "Regulatory Barriers to Lowering the Carbon Content of Energy Services."
MIT Report: The Future of Nuclear Power, and the supporting literature.
3 The other important data we use is the distribution heat rates for coal generators in the United States. This data is available from the Energy Information Agency. 4 We assume that at present, and for at least the next decade, base load electrical generation capacity will come from coal and natural gas, and the process of reducing carbon dioxide emissions in the United States will be substantially through the displacement of coal-fired generation by natural gas. These two fuels have different carbon intensities, with the amount of carbon dioxide per kilowatthour (kWh) produced by natural gas being less than the amount produced by coal. The difference in carbon intensity between marginal coal generators and natural gas generators allows us to calculate the cost of a carbon dioxide constraint. The technologies involved are linear. If at any point in time the price of electricity is greater than the cost of producing electricity using base load capacity, then that base load capacity will operate at full output.
Electrical production accounts for approximately 40 percent of the carbon dioxide produced in the United States. Coal produces about 33 percent of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions, which translates into about 81 percent of carbon dioxide emissions in the production of electricity. Replacing existing coal generation capacity with modern coal generation plants can only reduce total carbon dioxide by 5 percent.
5 Unless there is a technological breakthrough in carbon sequestration, the carbon intensity of coal means that "clean coal" cannot be an important factor in reducing carbon dioxide. However, through the development of nontraditional sources of natural gas, the United States is in the fortunate position of having enough new natural gas production coming online to make it possible to shift electricity generation from coal to natural gas, with a concomitant reduction in carbon dioxide emissions. 6 It is still doubtful whether natural gas supplies will be adequate to maintain this shift; therefore, development of nuclear and renewable electricity generation will need to continue at a rapid pace.
While electricity production amounts to less than half of the energy used in the United States, its central role in the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions is guaranteed by the fact that there is a transition technology to sources that emit 9. Carbon dioxide is a stock externality. For a discussion of stock externalities see Kolstad C., "Fundamental irreversibilities in stock externalities," and Laffont, J.J. and J. Tirole, "Pollution permits and compliance strategies." less and, eventually, to sources that are carbon-neutral. Consumption of transportation fuels that produce two billion metric tons (MT) of carbon dioxide would only be reduced by about 5 percent or less by carbon dioxide prices that are compatible with the elimination of coal generators 7 (see Table 1 , below). Thus, it might be necessary to decouple the pricing of allocations for transportation fuel from the allocations for the production of electricity.
THE MODEL
The equations that we use to calculate the cost of carbon dioxide can be derived intuitively and without much mathematical complexity if we make some very strong simplifying assumptions. First, assume that gas generators are competing with coal generators to provide base load power, where by base load power we mean electricity when demand is lowest. Second, assume that all coal generators are identical (this assumption will be dropped) and that all gas generators are identical. Third, assume that the price of electricity is constant. Fourth, assume that the market for electricity is in equilibrium. Given these assumptions, the equations that can be used to calculate the marginal cost of a carbon dioxide constraint in the production of electricity from coal and gas are p‫ס‬pa ‫ם‬b ‫ם‬c ‫ם‬d
(1)
where the price of electricity is ($/MWh), the amount of carbon dioxide prop duced (MT per MWh) is for coal and for gas. The allocated fixed-cost per a a 1 2
MWh is b 1 for coal and b 2 for gas. The cost of fuel is c 1 for coal and c 2 for gas. Nonfuel variable costs (overhead and maintenance) are d 1 for coal and d 2 for gas. The units of cost are dollars per megawatt-hour. These costs and parameters are available in the literature. 8 The cost of carbon dioxide per metric ton is .
9 p The right-hand sides of equations (1) and (2) are the costs of producing electricity by coal and gas, respectively. If the market is in equilibrium, then the cost of electricity should be the same under conditions where the carbon dioxide cost is binding for both sources, so: pa ‫ם‬b ‫ם‬c ‫ם‬d ‫ס‬pa ‫ם‬b ‫ם‬c ‫ם‬d . If we solve for the cost of carbon dioxide that would satisfy this relationship, , p we get
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for the case where coal and gas are sufficient to meet the needs. The mathematical complexity introduced in the appendix is needed to derive this equation without making these strong simplifying assumptions. There are three complications. First, the demand for electricity is not constant, but varies over time both daily and seasonally. The output of gas turbine generators can be varied rapidly, and the primary cost in gas generation is the cost of fuel. On the other hand, coal and nuclear output cannot be changed rapidly, making it virtually impossible to take advantage of hourly, or even daily, fluctuations in electricity prices caused by changes in demand.
The second complication is that, at the present time, there exists a large stock of coal generation capacity that ranges widely in efficiency and age. Thus, the assumption that all coal generators are identical cannot be correct. The assumption that gas generators are identical does not cause problems because we are assuming that existing coal generation capacity is being displaced by new gas generators.
The third complication is the assumption that the markets are in equilibrium. If the markets are in equilibrium, the cost of a capital investment should equal the present value of the income stream it generates. If gas and coal were competing at the margin, then a tax on carbon dioxide would reduce the income stream of a coal generator more than it would reduce the income stream of a gas generator. If the gas plant is not earning quasi-rents, then the present value of the income stream of the coal plant is less than the capital cost. However, coal plants have a life of 30 years or longer, and the investment is a sunk cost. Existing coal plants will not shut down as long as the average price of electricity over the price cycle is greater than or equal to the average variable cost, which depends on the cost of fuel, the cost of carbon dioxide, and the efficiency of the generator. We now calculate the cost of carbon dioxide emissions at which a coal plant of a given heat rate will shut down.
THE COST OF A CARBON DIOXIDE CONSTRAINT
We are going to calculate the relationship between the cost of a carbon dioxide constraint and the reduction in carbon dioxide emissions that results from replacing coal generators with gas generators. In order to do this we must explicitly recognize that the efficiencies of coal-fired generators vary. This variation can be quantified by the heat-rate of the generator defined as the BTUs/kWh. We modify equations (1) and (2) Note that equation (5) is now indexed by the subscript j to reflect that the stock of coal generation differs in efficiency.
10. The MIT study uses kilowatts and kilograms. Since our interest in the cost of carbon dioxide emissions and the units used are dollars per metric ton, it is more convenient to use megawatts and metric tons in the paper. The only exception will be heat rates, as the standard usage is BTU/kWh. The cost data for the calculations is the support paper for the MIT update, Du and Parsons (2009), pp. 20-32. We recognize that we are considering plants that already exist so that the sunk cost b ij ‫0ס‬ . Thus
The aim is to calculate the cost of carbon dioxide emissions that will make a coal generator of a given heat rate marginal. We will then use the distribution of heat rates of coal generators in the United States to calculate the cost of carbon dioxide per metric ton that will result in a given reduction in carbon dioxide emission in the generation of electricity. We used the 2009 MIT study as the base case to define the parameter values. The MIT study assumes that a modern coal generator has a heat rate of 8,870 British thermal units ( Since the emission of carbon dioxide is proportional to fuel consumption, we explicitly recognize that the carbon dioxide output of a coal generator is a function of its heat rate (BTU per kWh), using the MIT data as a base. It is R j convenient to define 0.839
where we define . The other important variable that varies with heat 0.839 a ‫ס‬ 10 8,870 rate is fuel cost. We recognize that the variable fuel cost for coal per MWh is a function of the heat rate of the generator
where is the cost of coal in $/MMBTU (million BTU) and is the heat rate q R 1 i in kWh/BTU. We assume, as mentioned above, that is the same for all gas c 2 generators and is the cost of gas in $/MMBTU, so . Note that at the q c ‫8.6ס‬q point where a coal plant is marginal, the present value of the income stream associated with that capital is zero, so the economic value of that plant is zero. Technically, the Lagrange multiplier associated with a nonbinding constraint is zero. This means that the term , if a generator with the heat rate is
Solving equations (5) and (6) for and defining as the heat rate of p R k the marginal generator, the solution can be written as
where is the cost per metric ton of carbon dioxide emissions that would make p k a gas generator with a heat rate marginal. This value depends on the cost of R k coal and gas as fuels and the capital cost of gas generators. Let equation (9) define the function . This notation will be useful later in the paper. p‫ס‬f (R) These values of as a function of are plotted in Figure 1 for coal at p R k k $1.50 per MMBTU and for gas at $5 per MMBTU. These figures reflect March 2010 prices. 11 We recognize that our model is sensitive to the relative prices of heat from the two sources. We use these prices as an example and will consider later the possible range of fuel costs. Figure 2 gives the distribution of the heat rates for coal generators in the United States by capacity.
Approximately 4 percent of coal generators have a heat rate greater than 11,500 BTU/kWh; 90 percent of coal generators have a heat rate between 9,500 BTU/kWh and 11,500 BTU/kWh; and 6 percent of coal generators have heat rates less than 9,500 BTU/kWh. Thus, a carbon dioxide price of $28.50/MT would cause 10 percent of coal generation capacity to shut down. A carbon dioxide price of $45/MT would cause 95 percent of coal generation capacity to shut down. These numbers may seem high, but they represent the shutdown point of existing coal generators. The shutdown point is when average variable cost is greater than price. Equation (9) and the distribution of coal generator capacity can be used to calculate the price of carbon dioxide emissions as a function of the amount of coal generator capacity shut down.
There are so many coal-fired generators in the country that approximating their distribution as a continuous function is quite satisfactory. Thus we define as the density function for the distribution of coal generators. Since coal c(R) generators with the highest heat rates are the first to be shut down, it is useful to define the cumulative distribution function as
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Figure 3: Price of Carbon Dioxide as a Function of Coal Generator Capacity Shut Down
Note: Assumed price of coal is $1.50 MMBTU and price of gas is $5 MMBTU.
R S(R)‫ס‬ c(s)ds
Ύ R where is the fraction of coal generators that have a heat rate greater than or S(R) equal to R, and is the highest heat rate of the coal generator stock. Let R R ‫ס‬ be the inverse of equation (10). Recall that equation (9) 
defines the function g(S)
, so p‫ס‬f (R)
defines the relationship between the price of carbon dioxide emissions and the amount of generator capacity that has shut down. This relationship is plotted in Figure 3 . The heat rates of coal generators are concentrated in a relatively narrow range with approximately 80 percent of coal generator capacity having a heat rate between 9,500 BTU/kWh and 11,000 BTU/kWh. As can be seen in Figure 3 . At current fuel prices, a price for carbon dioxide emissions of $30/MT will shut down less than 10 percent of coal generating capacity, and a price for carbon dioxide emissions of $45/MT will shut down over 90 percent. This suggests the possibility of instabilities in the electricity supply system in a cap-and-trade environment. The slope of the carbon dioxide price, , dp dS where S is percent of generator shut down, is illustrated in Figure 4 . If we examine Figure 4 , we see that for and for . The dp dp Ͻ0.5 10Ͻ SϽ90 Ͻ0.25 20Ͻ S Յ 90 dS dS average over this interval is approximately 0.17.
An implication of the concentration of the distribution of coal generator capacity is that as coal generation capacity responds to the price of carbon dioxide emissions, there may be volatility in the supply of electricity. Economists define the price elasticity of a quantity with respect to a price as Percentage change in Quantity Elasticity ‫ס‬ .
Percentage Change in Price
The elasticity of coal generator capacity, is
p S dp
Examining Figure 5 , we see that the elasticity of coal generator capacity is above 6 for SϽ70. A 1 percent change in the price of carbon dioxide emissions would cause 6 percent of coal generation capacity to shut down. The market for electricity is very complicated, and the price of electricity is very specific to time and location. However, the effect of a few generators being shut down by Enron There is a debate over whether a market for carbon dioxide or a carbon tax would more effective. In a world of perfect certainty, both policies are essentially equivalent and the debate is over the distributional implications of the policies. In a world with uncertainty, the merits of the policy may depend on the relative slopes of the benefits curve and the cost of the mitigation curve. A tax is preferable if the absolute value of the slope of the benefits curve is smaller than the absolute value of the slope of the cost curve. A market is preferable when the opposite is true.
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Our contribution to this debate is separate from this question and is more limited. Ninety percent of the coal generation capacity in the United States has heat rates between 9,500 BTU/kWh and 11,000 BTU/kWh. Our concern is that this concentration of coal generation capacity, coupled with the high elasticity of coal generation to the carbon price, could result in a volatile market for electricity. An argument for a market in coal generation permits is that a market price for carbon dioxide emissions would lead to efficient allocation of resources. However, if coal generation capacity is sensitive to the price of carbon dioxide, then a market in coal generation permits could introduce instability. may involve multiple lags. Generator capacity may be a lagged function of the price of carbon dioxide permits. The price of electricity may be a lagged function of generator capacity and price of carbon dioxide permits may be a lagged function of the price of electricity. Such lags, coupled with the high elasticity of coal generator capacity, suggest the possibility that the dynamics of such a market could be very volatile. See Nordhaus, W. "Life After Kyoto: Alternative Approaches to Global Warming Policies." A discussion of the market for carbon dioxide permits in Europe can be found in Alberola and Chevallier (2009), pp.51-79. 14. See http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/flowchart.html.
TOTAL REDUCTION IN CARBON DIOXIDE
The three sources of carbon dioxide are coal (2,125 billion MT), natural gas (1,242 billion MT), and petroleum (2,436 billion MT). Of this amount, the production of electricity accounts for 1,946 billion MT from coal, 263 billion MT from gas, and 40 billion MT from petroleum. In calculating the reduction in carbon dioxide from a charge on carbon dioxide emissions, we will calculate the following: 1) the reduction in carbon dioxide that comes from the displacement of coal generators by gas generators; 2) the reduction in carbon dioxide that comes from the decrease in the consumption of natural gas in domestic and commercial heating and industry as a result of a charge on carbon dioxide emissions; and 3) the reduction in carbon dioxide that comes from the decrease in the consumption of petroleum as a result of a charge on carbon dioxide emissions. We will ignore the effects of a charge on carbon dioxide emissions on the nonfuel use of coal because the nonfuel use of coal accounts for approximately 2 percent of carbon dioxide emissions, and we do not have estimates of the price elasticity for the various nonfuel uses of coal. where is the maximum economically viable heat rate. R Recalling that is the carbon intensity of gas, the total net reduction in a 2 carbon dioxide achieved by replacing coal generators by gas generators is given by 15. We are using the elasticity for gas from the Hartley and Medlock World Gas Model, p. 391. Estimates of the elasticity of motor fuels range from 0 to 0.1 in the short run and 0.4 to 0.7 in the long run. Based on our conversations with Hartley and Medlock, we are using 0.2. If we use an elasticity of 0.6, then at a carbon dioxide price of $55/MT, the reduction in the consumption of petroleum would increase from 1.9 percent to 5.7 percent. For a very nice discussion of the range of estimates of elasticities in the literature, see James C. Bartis et al., Producing Liquid Fuels from Coal, . There are other reductions in the emissions of carbon dioxide resulting from the cost of carbon dioxide caused by increased costs of the petroleum and natural gas not used in electrical generation. The reduction for gas and petroleum , respectively, is given by j‫3,2ס‬
where is the carbon dioxide emission for source j in the absence of constraints. B j Gas for domestic and commercial heating and industry corresponds to j‫,2ס‬ and petroleum corresponds to j‫.3ס‬ is the price per unit (dollars per 1000 ft 3 for p j j‫,2ס‬ dollars per barrel for j‫;)3ס‬ is the price elasticity; and is carbon intensity g b
per unit in metric tons. We are assuming that the elasticity for gas is and g ‫3.0ס‬ Table 1 gives the reduction in carbon dioxide from all sources that results from the price effects of carbon dioxide charges in the range of $25 to $55 per metric ton with the assumptions about costs and elasticities made heretofore.
Let us pause to summarize. The values for the price of carbon dioxide depend on the assumptions about the price of coal, the price of gas, and the elasticities for gas and petroleum. However, for plausible values of the relative prices of coal and gas, the general shape of the curve comes from the distribution of the heat rates of coal generators. The implication seems to be that cap-andtrade could result in a reduction on the order of 20 percent of carbon dioxide emissions achieved by replacing coal generators with gas generators. The carbon dioxide prices will vary over a fairly small range in the process. Thus for a carbon dioxide price of $30/MT or less, more than 90 percent of the coal generation capacity would be in operation, but a carbon dioxide price of $45/MT would cause 94 percent of the generation capacity to shut down (see Table 1 ). However, this price of $45 per metric ton of carbon dioxide would only result in an approximately 3 percent reduction in emissions of carbon dioxide from other uses of natural gas and petroleum. Once coal generators are replaced, further reductions require substantial increases in the price of carbon dioxide. In electricity generation, natural gas would have to be replaced by nuclear power or other noncarbon sources of electricity.
The relationship between the price of carbon dioxide and the price of petroleum, and the price of a gallon of gasoline and diesel fuel at the pump, depends upon both the amount of carbon dioxide emitted when the fuel is burned and the amount of carbon dioxide created in the exploration, production, refining, and distribution process. Thus, we are reluctant to estimate the effect of the cost of carbon dioxide on the price of the delivered fuel. As a minimal reference point, for carbon dioxide at $45 per ton, the cost of the carbon dioxide emitted when a gallon of gas is burned is 40 cents per gallon and 1.6 cents per kWh for gasgenerated electricity.
The concentration in the distribution of coal generator capacity limits the range of carbon dioxide prices that are viable without completely eliminating coal generators. Prices for carbon dioxide emissions that eliminate coal-generated electricity should not result in a substantial reduction in the consumption of pe- troleum and natural gas that is not used in electrical generation. This suggests that it may be useful to have separate policies to regulating electricity coal generation and transport fuels.
SENSITIVITY TO THE PRICE OF GAS AND COAL
Critical parameters in the calculations of the price of carbon dioxide are the price of natural gas and the price of coal. The price of natural gas is volatile and difficult to forecast. The current (March 2010) price of gas delivered to electrical generators is in the $4.50 to $5 per 1,000 cubic feet range; however, the price was as high as $12 per 1,000 cubic feet in 2008. It would take approximately 13.3 trillion cubic feet of natural gas per year to replace the electricity currently being produced by coal generators.
16 Current U.S. production is on the order of 20 trillion cubic feet per year. Expert opinion is that prices in the range of $6 to $8 may be sufficient to induce a supply increase of 6.5 trillion cubic feet. The market price of coal is more difficult to define, as coal is more heterogeneous than gas. However, the price of coal delivered to utilities ranges from $0.88 per MMBTU ($15 short ton, 8,500 BTU/lb) to $4 per MMBTU ($105 short ton, 13,000 BTU/lb). 18. A heat rate of 10,000, for the example, was chosen because it is near the mean of the distribution and simple to compute.
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This model provides a simple transparent model for calculating the price of carbon dioxide as a function of assumed fuel prices. Given the price of the fuels, Eq. (9) and the distribution of coal plant heat rates, the price of carbon dioxide required to shut down any given fraction of coal plants can be easily calculated. As an example, we calculate the price of carbon dioxide emissions that would shut down 70 percent of coal generating capacity. This would require shutting down coal generators with heat rates greater than 10,000 BTU/kWh.
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From equation (9),
The future price of gas will depend substantially on the increased demand for gas for electrical generation. In turn, the demand for gas will depend on policy decisions about nuclear power and renewables as well as policy decisions about allowable carbon dioxide emissions.
Another question that arises concerns U.S. policy with respect to coal. At the present time, most of the coal mined in United States is used for electrical generation. If the United States shuts down coal-fired generators, one would expect the price of coal to drop. However, the United States exports coal, and the price of coal in the United States should become the export price. It would be ironic if the result of cap-and-trade is that the United States exports coal to produce carbon dioxide abroad.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper calculates the cost of a carbon dioxide constraint-such as would result from cap-and-trade and other similar policies that restrict the output of carbon dioxide-by modeling the displacement of coal by gas in the production of electricity. Electrical production accounts for approximately 40 percent of the carbon dioxide produced in the United States. Of that amount, coal produces about 33 percent of total U.S. carbon dioxide emissions. It seems clear that, at present and for at least the next decade, the most important process reducing carbon dioxide emissions in the United States will be through the displacement of coal by natural gas. This process might take place either through regulatory actions, which might possibly be accomplished without explicitly regulating carbon dioxide, or through rationing carbon dioxide emissions. In the latter case whether done through cap-and-trade or a carbon tax, setting the total emissions goal will determine the price of carbon dioxide emissions. Assuming carbon dioxide emissions are capped, by some means, we can calculate the price (albeit an implicit price for the regulatory route) of carbon dioxide with this relatively simple model using parameters that are available in the literature. The two independent variables are the price of coal and natural gas as fuels. This assumes the displacement of coal by gas in electrical generation. This assumption, of course, might be invalidated some future technological breakthrough such great progress in carbon dioxide sequestration.
Approximately 90 percent of coal generators in the United States have heat rates between 9,500 BTU/kWh and 11,500 BTU/kWh. This concentration in the heat rates of coal generators is determines the shape of the curve that relates the price of carbon dioxide emissions to a reduction in carbon dioxide. This concentration of heat rates over a relatively narrow range implies that the carbon dioxide prices effective in managing the displacement of coal by gas are also restricted to a relatively narrow range. In the sample calculations in the paper, a carbon price of approximately $30/MT will shut down 10 percent of coal generator capacity. An additional increase of $15-resulting in a carbon dioxide price of $45/MT-will shut down 90 percent of coal generator capacity. Calculating the carbon dioxide price for various values of the price of coal and gas results in shifts of the curve, but the property of a narrow operating band remains.
This narrow band of prices has two interesting implications. First, the price of carbon dioxide that eliminates coal generation is not sufficiently high to have a large impact on the consumption of petroleum. To put it another way, any carbon dioxide price that would significantly reduce the consumption of transport fuels would have to be of a level that would completely shut down coal generators.
Second, the narrow range for the price of carbon dioxide means that the elasticity of coal generator capacity with respect to the price of carbon dioxide emissions is very high. This means that the supply of coal generator capacity would very sensitive to the price of carbon dioxide emissions that could result from cap and trade. The high elasticity of coal generators coupled with the fact that short run demand for electricity is very inelastic creates the possibility that cap and trade will result in high volatility in the market for electricity.
At the present time, it appears that the EPA regulatory approach currently being considered may apply only to utilities. Whatever the scheme used, utilities 19 . See Kaplan, Displacing Coal with Generation from Existing Natural Gas-Fired Power Plants, 2010. will be effectively decoupled from transportation fuels. The electricity generation infrastructure in the United States is already in the process of conversion to natural gas as coal-powered infrastructure ages. Fortunately, there is spare natural gas capacity within the system.
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It appears that additional carbon emission reductions must come from a more efficient vehicle fleet. New regulations require the efficiency of the vehicle fleet to improve by 30 percent. In 15 to 20 years, a more efficient vehicle fleet might reduce carbon dioxide emissions after the gains from transitioning electricity generation from coal to gas are exhausted. This conjecture is beyond the scope of the model.
APPENDIX 1 1. Mathematical Treatment
We are modeling the price of carbon dioxide during the transition from coal generation to gas generation. We will assume that there are two kinds of firms producing base load electricity. One class of firms indicated by the subscript 1 produces base load electricity using coal generators. They have a stock of coal generators that is heterogeneous, as we assume that coal generators vary in efficiency. The other class of firms uses gas generators indicated by the subscript 2. We assume that all gas generators supplying base load electricity are modern generators and that these firms are paying a capital cost that reflects the price of new investment. The key assumptions are:
1. Coal and modern gas generators are base load sources of power. Output is always positive if the generators are being operated as base load sources of power. 2. Coal generators cannot be cycled. Output is constant if the generator is in operation. 3. The capital cost of gas generators is the market rate and there are no quasi-rents.
Market for Electricity
The price of electricity is assumed to be cyclical to reflect daily, p(t) weekly, and seasonal variations in demand. We do not make any assumptions about long-term trends. We will assume that firms know . We assume that the p(t) representative firm has a planning cycle of length T. The planning cycle is the period of time over which investment decisions are made and carbon dioxide permits are allocated.
Coal Generators
Consider a representative firm that produces electricity from coal. Coal generators are heterogeneous and differ in their efficiency as measured by their heat rate defined in British Thermal Units (BTU) per kilowatt-hour. A coal generator indexed by j is assumed to have a heat rate R j where j‫,1ס‬ N (N‫ס‬the number of generators owned by the firm). Define as the electricity produced x (t) 1j per day by the representative firm using a coal generator with a heat rate .
R j Recall we assume that coal generators are a base load source of electricity and cannot be turned on just to supply peak load power. If it is possible to operate inefficient coal generators to provide peak load power, the problem becomes substantially more complicated. To address this we assume that the firm chooses a constant level of operation over the operating cycle, so that
for . can be zero if the plant is uneconomical.
The assumption that the output of a plant is constant over the planning period is made for mathematical simplicity, but it is not innocuous. In fact, it is not the optimum strategy. There are cases when discounting would result in marginal plants continuing to operate in the short term shutting down before reaching the end of the time period.
The amount of fuel a given generator burns to produce one megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity is proportional to its heat rate. We define the fuel cost per MWh of a coal generator with the heat R j as
where q 1 is the cost of coal in dollars/MMBTU (million British thermal units). The other variable cost is the sum of overhead and maintenance costs, d 1j . Because our data sources assume it, we are forced to assume the nonfuel variable cost is proportional to electrical output and given by .
We will assume that the representative firm owns a heterogeneous stock of coal generators, . Each generator owned by the firm has a capacity K , j‫,1ס‬N 1j constraint defined by
Total electricity produced by the representative firm using coal generators is given by The total production of carbon dioxide by the representative coal-generating firm is at time t given by the equation
We will assume that at the start of the planning period, , the firm is given an t‫0ס‬ allocation for the amount of carbon dioxide the firm can emit in the pro-Z (0) 1 duction of electricity during the period defined by T.
We will assume that there is a market of carbon dioxide permits and the firm can buy or sell these permits. The price of permits might fluctuate over a wide range during the period covered and a market in CO 2 emission futures is certain to develop. We cannot begin to model these uncertainties. Let us assume that the firm is not interested in speculation in this market, and instead plans to hedge by purchasing or selling contracts for CO 2 over the period with a certain delivery price that, including the net of the futures sale, is per ton of carbon p dioxide. Let be the net purchase or sale of permits in tons of carbon dioxide. n (T) subject to the capacity constraints (A-2) and the dioxide carbon constraint (A-9). Note that to simplify the algebra, we are not discounting.
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Since output is constant, this can be solved as a static problem. The Lagrangian for this optimization is 
Gas Generators
Since we are modeling the displacement of the existing coal generator stock by new gas generators, we are assuming that all gas generators are identical with the same heat rate. We will define the fuel cost per MWh of a gas generator as and the amount of carbon dioxide (metric tons per MWh) emitted by a gas c 2 generator as . The other costs are capital costs, b 2 , and overhead and maintea 2 nance costs, d 2 . These costs are from the 2009 update to the MIT study.
The amount of carbon dioxide by produce by a gas generator is given by dY (t) 2 ‫ס‬a x (t).
(A-14)
2 2
dt To avoid problems with the indeterminacy of the size of the firm when the technology is linear, we will assume that the representative gas-generating firm has a capacity constraint of and K 2 x (t) Յ K .
(A-15) 2 2
The firm leases capital at a lease rate, , that eliminates quasi-rents. The dimenb sions of a lease rate are . dollars ‫ן‬ (lease period) MWh Capacity We will assume that at the start of the planning period, , the repret‫0ס‬ sentative gas generator firm is given an allocation (0) for the amount of carbon Z 2 dioxide the firm can emit in the production of electricity during the period 0 Յ . t Յ T The firm can buy or sell these permits at a price . Let be the net p n 2 purchase or sale of permits. Thus the firm has constraint
